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ABSTRACT 
 
Developing countries have struggled with low electrification rates in the rural areas. 
This study investigates one major issue impeding the rural electrification programmes 
in rural Kenya: high connection payments. The paper uses estimates obtained from a 
stated preference study, namely a contingent valuation method completed in 2007, to 
examine the willingness to pay to connect to grid-electricity and photovoltaic 
services.  Expanding rural electrification will need subsidies, but the study shows that 
some forms of subsidy are more effective than others.  The key findings suggest that 
the government needs to reform the energy subsidies, increase market ownership and 
performance of private suppliers, establish financial schemes and create markets that 
vary according to social-economic and demographic groups.  
 
Key Words: Sub-Saharan Africa, willingness to pay (WTP), affordability, energy, 
rural electrification 
 
 
Acknowledgement  
The authors are grateful to the Royal Economic Society (RES) for the small expenses 
budget provided in this study and all households and enumerators in Kisumu District 
who participated in this study. 
Page 3 of 43 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
The electricity market involves a complex system where: economic, technical, 
institutional, financial, social, political and environmental factors influence the 
demands of the different consumers. Amongst all these factors, the institutions for the 
delivery of electricity services and the provision of finance to customers greatly affect 
these markets. In this context, policy refers to any new laws or regulations that: 
promote, accelerate or improve electricity services among rural populations. When a 
government policy seeks to promote access to renewable energy sources, it needs to 
influence factors such as: affordability, disposable income, availability and high 
quality of modern sources. (Barnes et al. 2005).  In the case of the residential sector, 
affordability is particularly considered to be one of the main obstacles to the adoption 
of modern energy.  This paper explores the affordability, access and investment 
regarding electricity services, by estimating the subsidies required and the policy 
actions needed to increase the take up of rural electrification programmes (REP) in 
Kenya.  
 
Like most countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Kenya is not an exception 
in facing energy dilemmas – one of the key obstacles to the shift to modern energy 
consumption is the limited access to electricity for households, particularly in the 
rural areas. The overall electrification rates in SSA (2000) stand at 23%, with the 
urban and rural area figures standing at 51% and 8% respectively (International 
Energy Agency (IEA) 2002). However, Kenya has electrification rates below the SSA 
average with 14% overall connection and a breakdown of 42% and 4% for urban and 
rural areas respectively (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) 2000).   One 
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reason for this low level of electrification in rural areas is the lack of available finance 
to cover capital and operating costs for generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity, which are higher than in urban areas. Moreover, the high connection costs 
coupled with low consumption of electricity and low incomes among rural households 
are further obstacles to the electrification of these households.  
 
Most rural households consume traditional energy sources derived from wood 
fuel, charcoal, agricultural residues and cow dung.  In fact, the dominant energy 
source for non-electrified households in Kenya is primarily wood fuel and charcoal.  
Wood fuel provides 70% of the energy for all sectors in the country, except for the 
transport and commercial sector.  Its use is common among households in rural areas, 
because it is relatively cheap and widely available and in fact 80% of these 
households consume this type of fuel. The impact of these traditional fuels on rural 
households includes adverse effects, such as: indoor air pollution (IAP), poor lighting 
and deteriorating environmental and economic well-being.   It has been reported that 
households are willing and able to pay, on average, about US$3-US$10 per kWh for 
improved energy services based on renewable energy resources including biomass 
(Kammen and Kirubi 2008).  Given such a high willingness to pay (WTP), one of the 
paradoxes is why electricity suppliers are not forthcoming and this paper attempts to 
provide some answers to this. 
 
There have been various policy programmes set up by the government and other 
relevant institutions, such as the Kenya Power & Lighting Company (KPLC), to 
increase rural electrification. One of the major areas has been the rural electrification 
programme (REP) established in the early 1970’s.  The REP funds are obtained from 
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a 5% levy, namely the rural electrification programme levy fund (REPLF), which is 
charged to all electricity users nationwide. The REPLF is one of seven decentralized 
operational funds in Kenya aimed at alleviating socio-economic disparities at the local 
level.      
 
Another initiative promoting electricity access in the rural areas is “Umeme 
Pamoja”, which translates as “Electricity Together”. This campaign aims to establish 
a joint group of households, so as to connect them collectively to the grid, thus saving 
costs. This scheme is financed by the group settlement electrification schemes created 
by the KPLC. According to them, this scheme is aimed at making electricity 
connection easier, affordable and faster (KPLC 2006).   
 
In Kenya the REP cost has been estimated to be between US¢ 30 to US¢ 40 
per kWh, compared with an amortized life-cycle cost of US$ 1 to US$ 2 per kWh for 
solar and battery operated systems (Jacobson 2005).  According to the World Bank 
(1995), only 10 to 50% of the economic cost of REPs is recovered from the users; 
thus these programmes have to be heavily subsidised by urban industrial users or by 
the government. About 60% of the REPLF finances new grid-extensions, with the rest 
being spent on operation and maintenance (Aligula et al. 2006).  Furthermore, 
Kenya’s REP has been handicapped by financial burdens (Kenya Integrated 
Household Budget Survey (KIHBS 2007). According to Eberhard and Gratwick 
(2005) the greatest challenge for energy market in Kenya is the sustainable balance 
between investment and supply.  Indeed, investment through greater involvement of 
new providers including the private sector is arduous task. In the case of Kenya, 
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privatization of the electricity sector is still embryonic and more has to be done to 
improve the reform efforts.   
 
This paper is structured into five sections. First, section 1 has provided an 
introduction and section 2 reviews current fuel use among rural households and the 
subsidies and affordability structures in place, as in the case for Kisumu district in 
Kenya. This is followed by a review of the valuation estimates for grid and 
photovoltaic systems (section 3), where results from a contingent study are used to 
review the tariff design in order to meet the costs of electricity connection. 
Recommendations are put forward with regards to increase of access and affordability 
of electricity service in rural areas (section 4). Section 5 contains the conclusion. 
 
2. CURRENT FUEL USE, SUBSIDIES AND AFFORDABILITY 
 
Rural households, not only have limited access to modern energy sources at 
reasonable rates, but also incur high expenditures on traditional fuel sources and this 
exacerbates the inaffordability of household fuels. Following Kebede’s (2006) 
estimation on the impact of energy subsidies on Ethiopian households, Table 1 shows 
the mean monthly fuel consumption for electrified and non-electrified rural 
households used in a Kisumu sample, converted into gross energy use in mega joules 
(MJ). This fuel consumption calculation involves the conversion all fuel sources for 
both rural electrified and non-electrified households.   
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Table 1: Mean monthly fuel consumption for electrified and non-electrified rural 
households 
      Electrified Non-electrified 
   
Energy 
content 
(MJ 
per 
unit) Quantity Price 
Expenditure 
(Ksh) 
Gross 
energy 
use 
(MJ) Quantity Price 
Expenditure 
(Ksh) 
Gross 
energy 
use 
(MJ) 
Agriculture Residue Kg 1.6 2.37 0.00 0.00 3.79 7.59 0.00 0.00 12.14 
Dung Cakes Kg 1.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 10.20 
Firewood Kg 2.4 32.09 14.04 450.35 77.01 35.79 10.94 391.55 85.89 
Charcoal Kg 9 18.17 81.31 1,477.56 163.54 29.57 48.79 1,442.59 266.09 
LPG Kg 27.3 19.25 47.72 918.49 525.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Kerosene Litres 15.1 52.61 5.65 297.17 794.36 81.64 4.32 352.81 1232.77 
Electricity kWh 3.6 59.09 4.19 247.73 212.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Candles Klumen 0.2 6.94 6.27 43.48 1.39 13.00 3.46 45.00 2.60 
Total energy expenses (Ksh)       3,435 1,778     2,232 1,610 
Total household expenses (Ksh)    18,037       10,755   
Share of total energy to total expenditure     19%       21%   
Source: Survey 2007 
 
 
As indicated in Table 1, electrified households are better off with respect to 
energy than those non-electrified, in that the proportion of expenditure on total energy 
use for the former is 19%, as compared with 21% for the latter. However, according 
to Fankhauser and Tepic (2005) a rule of thumb that should be achieved as the budget 
limit for energy services is 10% of total expenditure or income. Thus, it can be seen 
that the energy expenditure proportion for both electrified and non-electrified 
households in this instance is above this rule of thumb figure. Whilst electrified 
households spend a lower share of their total expenditure on energy, their total 
expenditure is almost 54% higher than non-electrified households and their energy 
consumption is 10% higher in megajoules, indicating that electrification is a move to 
more expensive energy. Given that their total expenditure levels are 67% higher than 
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non-electrified households, one can also conclude that the latter are generally much 
poorer than the former.  
We should also note from Table 1 that electrified households use a lot of LPG, 
whereas non-electrified households report no use of this fuel.  It would appear, 
therefore, that being electrified is associated with a shift to a cleaner fuel which has 
significant health benefits. Lastly, it is interesting to observe the difference in fuel 
prices between the two groups. In this regard, the price for the three main fuels, 
namely: firewood, charcoal and kerosene, are higher among the electrified households 
than for the non-electrified households.  This needs further investigation, but it could 
reflect the (a) purchase of better quality fuels by the richer electrified households or 
(b) the fact that poor households are willing to go further to search for lower cost 
sources, or both.  
 
For both electrified and non-electrified households, the three fuel sources: 
firewood, charcoal and kerosene represent a major proportion of their usage. 
However, in comparative terms these three fuel sources take up 98% of the non-
electrified total energy expenses, whereas the figure is 65% for their electrified 
counterparts. This means that the non-electrified households are spending 
considerably more on these traditional fuels than electrified households. One way of 
reducing the consumption of these fuels by the non-electrified is to provide them with 
electricity. However, if the non-electrified households are to make such an energy 
usage shift, this means they would reduce consumption of cheaper fuels, such as: 
kerosene, firewood and charcoal and thus they would require electricity subsidies, so 
as to keep their energy expense levels the same.   
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One measure of the affordability of electricity to the rural non-connected 
households would be to ask how could they afford to buy electricity and still maintain 
their present energy consumption levels.   For example, to do so they could reduce 
their consumption of firewood, kerosene and candles to release some money for 
electricity. Table 2 shows the amounts of energy and pattern of expenditure under one 
such arrangement where the price of electricity is estimated to be Ksh. 4.19 per kWh. 
Table 2: Potential for Electrification for Non-electrified Households 
(Assuming no increase in expenditure on energy and same total energy provision) 
  
Energy 
Content Non-Electrified 
  MJ/Unit Quantity Price Expenditure Energy 
Agriculture Residue Kg 1.6 7.59 0.00 0.00 12.14 
Dung Cakes Kg 1.7 6.00 0.00 0.00 10.20 
Firewood Kg 2.4 32.09 10.94 351.06 77.02 
Charcoal Kg 9.0 29.57 48.79 1442.72 266.13 
LPG Kg 27.3 0.00 47.72 0.00 0.00 
Kerosene Litres 15.1 76.40 4.32 330.05 1153.64 
Electricity kWh 3.6 25 4.19 104.75 90.00 
Candles Klumen 0.2 6.94 3.46 24.01 1.39 
Total Energy Expenditure Ksh    2,253 1,611 
Total Household Expenditure Ksh    10,755  
Energy Exp. As share of Total %    21%  
Source: Survey 2007 
 
Moreover, in this particular example it is taken that  households can afford to 
buy about 25kWh at this price, which excludes connection and fixed charges.  That is, 
if a household is not connected, there are significant connection charges, which along 
with other fixed charges, raise the cost per kWh well above this figure of 4.19 
Ksh/kWh. In respect of this, currently there is a fixed consumption charge of Ksh 120 
and a fixed connection payment of Ksh 35,000.  If that charge is spread over 60 
months, at an interest rate of 6.5%, we get a monthly payment of Ksh. 684.  Taking 
this together with the current lifeline tariff of Ksh 2/kWh, we have a cost per kWh of 
34 Ksh/kWh (equal to US¢51/kWh). This would increase total expenditure of the 
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non-electrified households from Ksh 2,253 per month to Ksh 2,998 or from 21% of 
total expenditure to nearly 28%. Clearly, some form of additional subsidy is needed if 
these households are to be electrified. 
 
As noted above, the charge for connecting non-electrified households under 
the current arrangement for spreading the cost is around Ksh.684, which represents a 
capital cost of Ksh 35,000 spread over 60 monthly payments at 6.5% interest. This 
figure represents less than the household’s monthly WTP mean value of Ksh.870 (see 
Table 4) for making a connection. Consequently, it would appear that the non-
electrified households could afford an electricity connection, so long as the total 
energy expenses could be kept within the envelope of current expenditure. As shown 
in Table 2, this may be possible by cutting kerosene and firewood use. However, we 
have to bear in mind that total energy provided in MJ cannot decline as a result and 
this acts as a major limiting factor. One possibility is to reduce the monthly payments 
by spreading them over a longer period or adopting a lower interest rate. Another 
suggestion would be a lower lifeline rate, but here we have to bear in mind that the 
current lifeline rate is already low at Ksh. 2 per kWh and is expected to increase in the 
near future. Moreover, the pressure on the subsidy which currently exists is high, as 
we will see below.  One way of addressing this issue and at the same time making 
electricity available for new connections, would be to reduce the lifeline rate to cover 
only 25kWh.  This suggestion is investigated in detail later in the paper.  
 
Electricity Subsidies 
Electricity serves a heterogeneous population, which includes: industrial, commercial 
and domestic users and each is serviced under different costs and units of supply.  For 
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a variety of reasons, electricity use is cross-subsidized among the various categories 
and there are subsidy differentials for the different types of users. The KPLC tariff 
schedules distinguish five classes of tariff rates: A (ordinary domestic consumers and 
small commercial), B (medium commercial and industrial consumers), C (large 
consumers and industrial consumers), D (interruptible off-peak supplies to ordinary 
consumers) and E (street lighting).1 The commercial and industrial consumers are the 
major users of electricity for economic production and consume 75.5% of the total of 
the distributed electricity, whereas the domestic class or residential users consume 
only 23% (KPLC 2006).  The residential group is often considered less important, 
because of their low consumption rates and low contribution to economic output.   
 
Figure 1 illustrates the various tariff charges for two groups of residential 
users: non-lifeline tariff (for an assumed consumption of 150 kWh per month) and 
lifeline tariff (for assumed consumption of 50 kWh per month). It can be seen that in 
the 1990’s and early 2000’s both rates were comparable, but more recently the non-
lifeline consumption has become much higher compared that of the lifeline tariff for 
residential households. For those poor households whose consumption is below the 
lifeline tariff limit, i.e. 50 kWh, their charges have been stable until recently when a 
new lifeline tariff of Ksh. 2 per kWh (2008) was introduced. Holding inflation 
constant, the figure shows that the 150 kWh real electricity rate has been continually 
decreasing since 1999 and it is only recently that the tariffs have risen for all 
categories of consumers.   
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Figure 1: Selected average electricity prices in Kenya for lifeline and non-lifeline 
residential users (in Ksh./kWh) 
Source: Newbery 2005 and own estimation 20082
 
Other charges above the consumption charges include: fixed charge, Energy 
Regulatory Commission (ERC) levy, fuel cost adjustment (FCA), foreign exchange 
rate fluctuation adjustment (FXFA) and VAT. In 2000, the fixed charge was Ksh. 75 
(US¢107) and this has now increased by 60% to Ksh. 120 (US¢180) in 2008.3 The 
statutory charges including: the ERC levy at Ksh. 0.03 kWh, the REP fee at 5% and 
VAT at 16% remain unchanged. Other variable costs, which tend to fluctuate with 
international markets, include FXFA and FCA.  Otieno and Awange (2006) reported 
that as much as 70% of Kenya’s electricity consumer bill comprises taxes and levies 
that are rarely re-invested into the system to improve supply. 
 
New tariff rates introduced in July 2008 by the ERC revised the consumption 
and fixed monthly rates for all classes. For instance, the domestic monthly charge for 
the lifeline tariff in 2008 was priced at Ksh. 2.00 (US¢3) per kWh, which is a 50% 
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increase on the 2000 rate of Ksh. 1.55 (US¢2). Shown in Table 3 are the old and new 
tariffs and the estimated subsidies required to cover the long-run marginal cost 
(LRMC) of Ksh 28.67 and Ksh. 40.28 in 2005 and 2008, respectively.  
 
Table 3: New and old monthly tariff for rural (lifeline) and urban (non-
lifeline) users 
  Urban Rural Urban Rural 
  2005 (old tariff) 2008 (new tariff) 
Quantity (kWh) 74 47 77 50 
Marginal cost (Ksh.)a 28.67 28.67 40.28 40.28 
Tariff (Ksh. per kWh) b 5.80 1.55 7.08 2.00 
Unit Subsidy (Ksh per kWh) 22.87 27.12 33.20 38.28 
Number of electrified population c 5,135,332 906,633 5,761,393 1,017,163
Annual (current) subsidy Million. Ksh. 104,291 13,868 176,720 23,362 
Annual (current) subsidy Million US$ d  1,391 185 2,489 329 
Notes: 
a  Inflation rate on marginal cost is 12% in 3 years average 
b Cost excludes: the fixed charge, ERC levy, fuel cost adjustment (FCA), foreign exchange rate 
fluctuation adjustment (FXFA) and VAT 
c Electrification rate in rural areas is at 4% and 46% in urban areas (2004/5) taking account 
the national total population in 2005 and 2008 
d US $ exchange rate in 2005 and 2008 was 75 Ksh and 71 respectively 
 
According to a Ministry of Energy (MoE) study (2002), a rural household consumes 
an average of 544 kWh a year, in other words, the monthly average consumption in a 
rural household is about 45 kWh, whereas urban households use a monthly average of 
70 kWh. Taking 5% as the annual increase for both urban and rural users, the 
estimated monthly quantity consumed in 2005 becomes 74 kWh and 47 kWh 
respectively and the corresponding figures for 2008 would be 50 kWh and 77 kWh 
respectively. Table 3 highlights two important features: the amount of subsidies 
needed is very substantial, and it can be seen that nearly 90% of the current subsidies 
are directed towards urban consumers.  These figures can be put into perspective by 
noting that the projected total subsidies of US$2.8 billion in 2008 would constitute 
about 11% of the GDP totalling nearly US$25billion. 
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The calculation of LRMC and its use in pricing electricity is to ensure that 
utility operators are covered in the long-term by the price. There are implications 
when households are charged below the LRMC as this brings financial difficulties for 
utility operators unless enormous subsidies are provided by the GoK to cover any 
potential loss to the suppliers and distributors. For example, the GoK subsidization 
amount of nearly Ksh. 2.1 billion (US$ 30 million) to the KPLC, between 2003 to 
July 2006, reduced their wholesale tariff rate from Ksh. 2.36 (US$ 0.03) per kWh to 
Ksh. 1.76 (US$ 0.01) kWh (Munaita 2008). However, these payouts make the 
electricity producers dependent on ‘operational subsidies’ and hence they are 
unprotected when funds are unavailable from central government (Barnes and Foley 
2004). For producers and distributors, the affordability and subsidization issues 
impede cost recovery, particularly when the electricity services are distributed to 
dispersed households on low-incomes and with low electricity consumption.4   
3. VALUATION ESTIMATIONS 
In 2007 a valuation exercise using a contingent valuation method was carried out to 
estimate the WTP values for non-electrified households to gain connection to both 
grid electricity (GE) and photovoltaic (PV) systems in Kisumu district. Table 4 
indicates that the WTP estimates for PV systems have been found to be lower than 
those for GE, which implies that PV is less attractive than GE. However, this could be 
attributed to the sample choice, whereby the households who were interviewed were 
residing less than 600 metres from a transformer and as a consequence, GE 
connection was seen as desirable and achievable. 
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Table 4: Average Willingness to pay (WTP) for connecting to grid electricity and 
photovoltaic systems  
  Connection fee amount  
 Ksh. US$ 
Grid Electricity (GE) Lump 20,090 301 
Grid Electricity (GE) Monthly a 870 13 
Photovoltaic (PV) Lump 18,560 278 
Photovoltaic (PV) Monthly a 700 10 
a Monthly payments are over 5 years 
Source: Survey 2007 
 
One of the applications of WTP estimates is to assist in the formulation of effective 
tariff and subsidy design. With regards to tariff design, the WTP values are the 
maximum amounts that households can pay for electricity services against 
affordability.  Hence, these values when measured against the full cost of recovery, 
identify the proportion of the population who can afford provision at their own values. 
Affordability rates are important for electricity tariff design and also for government 
subsidy programmes, in recognizing the target population to receive subsidies.  If a 
high proportion of the population is unable to afford the cost of the service and 
consumption is considered socially desirable, then financial transfers or cross-
subsidies are required (Komives et al. 2005).  It is estimated that about 70% of the 
households in SSA and India cannot afford to pay the full cost of recovery (Foster and 
Yepes 2006).   
 
In the next section, the cost of electrifying households against their affordability 
levels and their WTP estimates are analyzed in detail, with regard to: grid-electricity, 
solar PV systems and other off-grid systems.   
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 (a)  Grid electricity versus solar photovoltaic systems 
The WTP for the grid-system, as found in a valuation study, has higher values than 
those of a solar PV system. One reason for the reduced WTP for solar PV systems 
among households is the awareness of the limitations of such services, i.e. the 
restricted duration of provision and knowledge about the benefits of electricity, for 
other uses apart from lighting and entertainment, which PV systems cannot support. 
The debate whether to adopt grid-options, as opposed to off-grid options, requires an 
upfront cost analysis where households’ expenses for each electricity service are 
compared and contrasted.  Table 5 shows the upfront costs for: grid, solar PV and 
pico-hydro (mini-grid) systems. It can be seen that costs of connecting to the grid are 
much higher than those for the other options. 
 
 
Table 5: Upfront cost analysis of grid electricity, solar PV systems & pico-hydro in 
Kenya 
  
Grid Electricity 
a
Grid-
Electricity 
2007 
survey b
Solar 
PV 
systemc
Solar 
PV 
system 
2007 
survey 
d
Pico-hydro 
mini-grid 
serving 65 
households 
(1.1 kW) 
Pico-hydro 
mini-grid 
serving 110 
households 
(2.2 kW) 
Capital cost per household 
incl. internal wiring & 
fittings (US$) 2,360-3,840 271 325c 200 56e 54e
Project design & 
management and labour 
cost per household (US$) n.a. n.a n.a n.a 26 17 
Subscription/Installation 
or connection cost per 
household (US$)f 33 534 73 421 80 80 
Useful lifespan (years) Almost infinite n.a 20g n.a 20 20 
Total upfront cost per 
household (US$) 2,393-3,873 805 398 621 162 151 
Total of upfront cost as % 
of annual  household 
income (non-electrified) 170% 44% 22% 34% 9% 8% 
Source: Karikezi et al. 2004 and survey 2007 
Notes: 
a) Estimated cost of grid-extension to one household, where there is no transformer required and the 
nearest connection point is about 500-900 metres—the equivalent respective distance to the furthest 
point of connection from the powerhouse for the two pico-hydros considered in Kirinyanga district 
Maher et al.(2003). The cost covers the required: poles, conductors, termination accessories and other 
fittings 
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b) Estimated cost of grid-extension within a 600 metres radius of the transformer for one household 
and associated cost with wires & fittings  
c) Cost per solar PV system installed in one household. The system comprises: a 24 W panel, a battery, 
a charge controller, lights and associated wires & fittings 
d) Cost of PV system installed in one household. The system comprises: a 40 Wp panel, a battery, a 
charge controller, lights and appropriate wires & fittings 
e) Total cost of: civil works, generation equipment, control and protection gear and the distribution 
system 
f) Refers to a one-off payment to initiate the electricity service. The amount indicated for pico-hydro is 
the maximum chargeable fee (for 2 lights and 1 socket). A lower fee of around US$60 is chargeable, 
where only 1 light and a socket are used. In the case of solar the PV system it is the cost of installing 
the system. 
g) Only applies to PV panel, as battery requires replacement every 3-5 years  
 
Because the cost of both PV and pico-hydro systems are lower compared to 
grid systems, if the consumer confers value on them equally, it would seem 
reasonable to promote the two off-grid systems as they are less expensive than the 
grid systems. This implies that the connection subsidy required for the PV and pico-
hydros systems would be lower than for grid electricity. However, the results of this 
study have revealed it is not that simple because the WTP estimates that have 
emerged with regards to the value given to PV and grid systems by the households 
were not the same, that is, households expressed a strong preference for the latter. 
(b) Payment options and WTP  
There has been progress in reducing the costs for both grid and off-grid services, but 
the biggest hurdles are the initial connection fees and monthly consumption costs for 
low-income households (Townsend 2000). In order to assess the affordability for 
connecting to electricity services, it is necessary to compare household income with 
connection cost. Affordability refers to the actual ability of a household to pay for 
goods/services and it can be distinguished between the affordability for access and the 
affordability for consumption (Estache et al. 2002), which are both are examined in 
this study. Table 6 illustrates the WTP connection payments as a proportion of 
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monthly income in deciles, for both GE and PV systems, for two payment options: 
monthly connection and one-off lump sum payments. 
 
Table 6: Proportion of connection payments (monthly and one time) for grid-
electricity (GE) and photovoltaic (PV), by income deciles 
 
One time connection payment Monthly connection payment spread over 5 years 
  A B C D  A' B' C' D' 
Monthly 
income 
deciles 
GE actual 
connection 
cost 
(onetime)1
GE WTP 
connection 
estimates  
(onetime) 2
PV actual 
connection
cost 
(onetime)1
PV WTP 
connection 
estimates  
(onetime) 2
GE actual 
connection 
cost 
(monthly) 3
GE WTP 
connection 
estimates 
(monthly) 2
PV actual 
connection 
cost 
(monthly) 4
PV WTP 
connection 
estimates 
(monthly) 2 
1 2093% 657% 1615% 531% 44% 24% 34% 18% 
2 1244% 393% 959% 358% 26% 17% 20% 10% 
3 1010% 285% 779% 258% 21% 14% 17% 10% 
4 844% 274% 651% 257% 18% 13% 14% 10% 
5 726% 268% 560% 257% 15% 10% 12% 8% 
6 611% 191% 471% 185% 13% 9% 10% 7% 
7 499% 123% 385% 123% 11% 7% 8% 5% 
8 398% 133% 307% 159% 8% 7% 7% 5% 
9 335% 119% 258% 103% 7% 6% 5% 4% 
10 184% 103% 142% 73% 4% 3% 3% 2% 
Source: Survey 2007 
Notes:  
1) A one-off lump sum for both grid and PV capital and connection cost is Ksh. 56,350 (US$805) and 
 Ksh.43, 470 (US$621), respectively, obtained from Table 5, which excludes any variable cost 
2) Connection at WTP values by income deciles without variable cost, i.e. consumption cost 
3) Monthly capital and connection cost excluding variable cost is Ksh. 1,197.27 for 60 months at 10% 
4) Monthly capital and connection cost with zero variable cost is Ksh. 923.61 for 60 months at 10% 
 
It is clearly apparent from Table 6 that the lower deciles would face 
prohibitive payment levels for one-off payment, regardless of whether they were 
subsidized or not.  Consequently, the preferred payment system is monthly payments, 
as shown in columns (A', B', C' and D'), but even with monthly payments the WTP is 
less than the connection cost.  Hence, it is apparent that it would be necessary to 
spread the payments over a much longer period, maybe as much as 10 years, and 
reduce the interest rate to 5%, so as to increase the take up of electricity connection.  
To this end, Table 7 illustrates the monthly connection cost for GE and PV systems 
for various scenarios based on the figures in columns A' and C' in Table 6. That is, 
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with regards to A'', A''', A'''', A''''' represent four different payment periods at 5% for GE 
at WTP B'. Likewise, for C'', C''', C'''', C''''' are the same extrapolations for PV with 
WTP D'. It can be seen that wherever the ability to pay is lower than the 
corresponding WTP, the household in the decile in question can afford connection to 
either GE or a PV system.   
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Table 7: Monthly connection costs with varying payment duration at 5% interest 
 GE monthly PV monthly 
  A' B' A'' A'''   A'''' A'''''  C' D' C''  C'''  C''''  C'''''  
Monthly 
income 
deciles 
GE actual 
connection 
cost 60 
months 
10%  
GE WTP 
connection 
estimates  
GE actual 
connection 
cost 60 
months 
5%  
GE actual 
connection 
cost 80 
months 
5%  
GE actual 
connection 
cost 100 
months 
5%  
GE actual 
connection 
cost 120 
months 
5%  
PV actual 
connection 
cost 60 
months 
10%  
PV WTP 
connection 
estimates  
PV actual 
connection 
cost 60 
months 
5%  
PV actual 
connection 
cost 80 
months 
5%  
PV actual 
connection 
cost 100 
months 
5%  
PV actual 
connection 
cost 120 
months 
5%  
1 44% 24% 39% 30% 25% 22% 34% 18% 30% 24% 20% 17% 
2 26% 17% 23% 18% 15% 13% 20% 10% 18% 14% 12% 10% 
3 21% 14% 19% 15% 12% 10% 17% 10% 15% 12% 10% 8% 
4 18% 13% 16% 12% 10% 9% 14% 10% 12% 10% 8% 7% 
5 15% 10% 13% 10% 9% 7% 12% 8% 11% 8% 7% 6% 
6 13% 9% 12% 9% 7% 6% 10% 7% 9% 7% 6% 5% 
7 11% 7% 10% 8% 6% 5% 8% 5% 7% 6% 5% 4% 
8 8% 7% 7% 6% 5% 4% 7% 5% 6% 5% 4% 3% 
9 7% 6% 6% 5% 4% 3% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 
10 4% 3% 4% 3% 2% 2% 3% 2% 3% 2% 2% 1% 
Source: Survey 2007 
 4. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Some of the policy recommendations provided in this section would retain the present 
government policies. However, recommendations developed in this paper emphasise 
the need to increase access to electricity services for domestic users. Laid out below 
are the options that decision makers and policy makers could initiate to meet rural 
electrification needs. Some of these recommendations have already been proposed by 
researchers, think-tanks, as well as by government and multilateral institutions. In this 
paper, whilst we accept many of these proposals, the focus is on the specific needs of 
Kenya, and through this we have identified a number of idiosyncrasies that could be 
of relevance to other developing countries. The policies highlighted include: 
establishing financial schemes, reforming subsidies, creating markets taking into 
account the SED factors and improving the market ownership and performance of the 
suppliers.  
(a) Establishing financial schemes 
Most financial institutions in rural areas cater for salaried rural employees, such as: 
civil servants, teachers and self-employed proprietors. Therefore, for many first-time 
users wanting to connect to grid-electricity or PV systems, financial schemes through 
banks or microfinancing are unavailable. As a result, there is a need to establish long 
term schemes to finance initial or upfront costs for acquiring PV systems and grid-
electricity, which as mentioned earlier are an impediment to electrification in rural 
areas. In this regard, the financial programmes available for connecting households to 
electricity services vary according to the different financial institutions’ interests.  For 
example, in Kenya the financial schemes provided by the banks and micro-finance 
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institutions for connecting to solar PV systems are far better than those for grid-
electricity, as monthly instalments by banking loans or hire purchase systems exist for 
the former owing to shorter payment duration and smaller loan amounts. According to 
World Bank surveys in a number of countries, respondents have indicated their 
willingness to take medium-term loans to pay the upfront cost, which they would then 
pay back through their monthly bills over five years or more (Townsend 2000). A 
good example is the case of Bolivia, where the number of new customers doubled 
when connection cost was spread over 5 years, despite an increase from 25 to 30 cents 
per kWh in grid-electricity cost (Barnes and Foley 2004). This is unlike Malawi’s 
case, where new customers were charged upfront full cost line extension, (with a 30 
year life), which resulted in 2% rural electrification rates.   
 
The results of this study have shown that there is a high WTP for GE 
electricity even for individuals in poor households, regardless of it costing a 
substantial share of their income. However, households’ WTP for PV systems has 
emerged as being lower than for grid electricity. Moreover, as illustrated in Table 8, 
the difference between the WTP estimates and total cost, by decile, is higher for GE 
electricity than for PV systems in nearly all cases. That is to say, as the table 
illustrates, regardless of whether payment is over 60 months (5 years) at 10% interest 
or over 120 months (10 years) at 5% interest, the margins between the WTP and total 
cost are higher for grid electricity. In this regard, a negative sign indicates that total 
cost is higher than the WTP values.  For instance, the GE monthly would only be 
taken up by the top three income deciles at a 5% interest rate and by none of them at a 
10% interest rate. Given the low connection costs of PV systems in contrast to GE 
systems, the PV option would offer a greater potential for market penetration into the 
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non-electrified households, because lower levels of subsidy would be required than 
for GE. 
Table 8: Difference between grid electricity (GE) and photovoltaic (PV) system costs 
and WTP values, by deciles, monthly payments and interest rates (in Ksh.) 
 
GE monthly PV monthly 
WTP values 
by decile 
Difference 
between total 
cost and WTP 
values, 60 
months, 10%1
Difference 
between total 
cost and WTP 
values, 120 
Months, 5%1
Difference between 
total cost and WTP 
values, 60 months, 
10%2
Difference 
between total 
cost and WTP 
values, 120 
Months, 5%2
1 -863.77 -264.18 -438.61 23.93 
2 -726.77 -127.18 -454.36 8.18 
3 -717.06 -117.47 -391.32 71.22 
4 -632.27 -32.68 -282.67 179.87 
5 -742.02 -142.43 -294.11 168.43 
6 -651.07 -51.48 -259.41 203.13 
7 -699.94 -100.35 -334.61 127.93 
8 -453.57 146.02 -267.30 195.24 
9 -500.05 99.54 -245.83 216.71 
10 -586.48 13.11 -287.03 175.51 
Source: survey 2007 
Notes:  
1. Monthly total market cost inclusive of variable cost for a monthly consumption of 50 kWh costing 
Ksh.300. For a GE system the total monthly cost is Ksh. 1,497.27 for 60 months at 10% interest and it 
is Ksh. 897.68 for 120 months at 5% interest. 
2. Monthly total market cost for a PV system for 60 months at 10% interest is Ksh. 923.61 with zero 
variable cost, whereas for 120 months at 5% interest it is Ksh. 461.07. 
 (b) Reforming electricity subsidies 
Creating subsidy policies needs to take the form of a delicate balancing act. Subsidies 
must be made available to give the poor access to modern energy services, however, 
care must be taken not to distort the energy market or target one type of fuel more 
than another. Moreover, it is important to ensure that the better-off do not benefit 
from the subsidy arrangements at the cost of the poor. There have been criticisms 
about the role and allocation of subsidies by governments in the markets and the main 
objection is that they should not be earmarked towards operating costs. CORE 
International Inc. (2003), an international consulting firm supporting international 
development agencies, amongst others, has posited that subsidization of investment 
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costs or capital costs rather than consumption is more effective. Moreover, it has been 
argued that operating costs should be wholly-financed by the tariff charges. A good 
example is that of the Argentinean subsidies provided towards connection, where 
households paid 10% of the initial installation or connection cost of U$800 and 40% 
of the system life-cycle costs (US$1,400 including maintenance and battery costs), 
over the 15-year life of the system and the remaining 50% of the life-cycle costs were 
covered by government subsidies (ESMAP 2000a). The connection cost, in the case 
of Argentina, was partially subsidized by a World Bank loan, GEF grant and there 
was some funding by the state (Tomkins 2001).   
 
On the utility providers’ side, the amounts of subsidies which can be made 
available to them are determined by the scale of electrification that they are able to 
offer. According to Tomkins, output based contracting where private providers are 
given subsidies towards output, is one way forward for meeting the electrification 
needs of rural areas (2001). This approach has been applied in the case of Argentina, 
where exclusive concession areas have been established and the private operator is 
paid a connection subsidy that is related to the distance from the grid. Similar to this 
was the case of Chile, where the state identified areas needing electricity and through 
a special fund provided a one time direct subsidy to private electricity distributors to 
cover some of the investment costs involved in their rural electrification project and 
this resulted in an increased coverage of rural electricity systems, from 53% in 1992 
to 76%, by the end of 1999 (Jadresic 2000). 
 
In the past the GoK has subsidized off-grid options, such as solar PV systems, 
by removing import duties on PV components.  In this regard, initially, the imported 
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components were subject to an import charge of 30% duty, which raised the costs of 
the systems (Barnes and Floor 1996). However, the elimination of this charge has 
been insufficient to advance the adoption of these alternatives fast enough. One way 
to accelerate the connection of these systems is to set up effective financial structures. 
This, as discussed earlier, would involve the establishment of financial schemes by 
the government in collaboration with the financial institutions, such as local banks 
and microfinancing companies, to identify and provide unsecured credit for the poor. 
However, careful attention will need to be paid to the detail regarding how to deal 
with defaults, where customers end up not paying the monthly payments.  Indeed, 
delinquent consumers are difficult to manage and require high administrative costs to 
monitor. Ledgerwood (1999) has suggested that once defaulters have been identified, 
field staff should follow up arrears payments. If this fails to work, some of the 
following initiatives should be employed:  public announcements in the press as to 
who is a delinquent payer, repossession of assets, erecting of signage outside the 
borrower’s home and/or charging a defaulter with a crime.  
 
 (c) Subsidizing consumption costs and connection 
Subsidies should be aimed at creating efficiency and equity. On the one hand, 
charging more to those who are wealthier or big users is appropriate, but on the other 
hand, these categories may gain the incentive to leave the system and self-generate, 
owing to the high costs imposed on them. The GoK, along with the ERC, need to 
develop a system that can identify the target group for subsidized connection and 
lifeline tariff, i.e. the poor, which is difficult. Typically, around 35-40 kWh is the 
basic monthly consumption for low-income households in urban areas (Barnes and 
Floor 1996). These consumption figures, however, are similar to those for high-
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income rural households in Kenya today, (it should be acknowledged that they are a 
decade old) and this makes any cross-subsidization arrangements, whereby the richer 
households help to subsidize the poor, almost impossible because they cannot be 
differentiated. One proposition is to reduce the lifeline tariff to 25 kWh, or less, for 
low-income households in rural areas who only use small amounts of electricity for 
lighting purposes. In this vein, other developing countries, such as Thailand, have set 
their lifeline tariff at 35 kWh per month.  
Another proposition here is to subsidize the connection costs for both GE and 
PV systems, that is to say, the GoK through the local authorities, could subsidize a 
third of the connection cost with the rest being paid by the household. However, this 
connection subsidy would not cover the wiring and consumption costs, for which end-
users are responsible. As shown in Table 9, without subsidy only the highest two 
income deciles can afford GE systems, if we accept the 10% rule of thumb as 
discussed previously. This figure rises to the four highest deciles when considering a 
non-subsidized PV system. However, when a subsidy of a third is included, the 
proportion of GE households coming within the 10% affordability benchmark rises to 
four deciles and perhaps more importantly, regarding PV systems, seven deciles fall 
within this range. This indicates that subsidizing PV would be a far more effective 
way of meeting the REP objectives in Kenya. 
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 Table 9: Comparison of monthly charges for connection at actual and subsidized 
payment cost for grid electricity (GE) and photovoltaic (PV) systems as % of Income 
Monthly 
income 
deciles 
GE actual 
connection cost 
(monthly) 
inclusive of 50 
kWh use charge1
PV actual 
connection cost 
(monthly)2
GE subsidized-
connection cost 1/3 off 
inclusive of 50 kWh 
consumption charge 
(monthly) 
PV subsidized-
connection cost 1/3 
off,  (monthly) 
1 58% 39% 43% 26% 
2 34% 23% 26% 15% 
3 28% 19% 21% 12% 
4 23% 16% 17% 10% 
5 20% 13% 15% 9% 
6 17% 11% 13% 8% 
7 14% 9% 10% 6% 
8 11% 7% 8% 5% 
9 9% 6% 7% 4% 
10 5% 3% 4% 2% 
Source: Survey 2007 
Notes: 
1) Monthly total market cost of GE system inclusive of variable cost of 50 kWh costing Ksh.300 
is Ksh. 1,599.33 for 60 months at 10% interest  
2) Monthly total market cost for a PV system for 60 months at 10% interest is Ksh. 1,041.11 with 
zero variable cost 
 
In other developing countries the subsidization policies vary according to 
governments objectives, with regard to REP targets. For example, in the case of Chile 
where rural electrification stands at around 80%, the average state subsidy per 
household was US$1,080 in 1995, which was later increased to US$1,510 in 1999, 
owing to the priorities set by the state for maximizing rural electricity coverage 
(Jadresic 2000). However, there been other cases where subsidies have 
disproportionally been allocated, such as in case of Malawi, where the urban 
households have been subsidized at US$ 300 compared to rural households getting 
US$ 60. In the case of Kenya, there needs to be a distinction made between several 
different regions, where the Coastal, Western and Eastern provinces are perceived as 
being poorer and as having certain climatic and geographic conditions which affect 
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the cost of supply from both grid and off-grid systems. That is, there needs to be a 
sliding scale of subsidies with regards to cross-subsidizing for the different Kenyan 
regions. 
(d) Creating markets according to SED groups 
According to De Gouvello and Durix (2008), there are two approaches, namely 
systematic and pragmatic, which can been used to address the impact of an REP.   
Both approaches are complementary, with the former providing an overview of all the 
productive uses of electricity to potential users, whereas the latter identifies practical 
cases of existing energy programmes, thus offering tangible results. The importance 
of combining these two strategies is to be able to assess the extent to which REPs 
influence the socio-economic development of communities. Moreover, the two 
approaches, in combined form, can assist in the identification of appropriate cottage 
industries for rural households who intend to start income generation businesses, 
particularly those related to the agricultural sector.  Income generation and ownership 
for small rural businesses leads to a sense of achievement and well-being, which 
stimulates further economic development.  These activities can mushroom, involving 
many participants, and thereby lead to significant regional/district economic growth.   
They also generate income, which makes electricity connection affordable. 
 
Where grid-electricity is expensive for rural households, because of high costs 
and dispersion of the population, the penetration of other off-grid systems, such as 
PVs, should be encouraged.  As found in this study, the differences between WTP and 
cost for PV systems are generally much lower than for GE (see Table 8). Hence, 
subsidies should be targeted at PV system provision, rather than for the grid, by 
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directing them towards those private PV system distributors who would be willing 
and able to facilitate the connection of dispersed households.  
  
Additionally, there is a potential market for the electrical equipment and 
appliances that people need to gain access to. In this vein, the households interviewed 
in our survey were found to own: radios, televisions and electric irons.  That is, as 
electricity end-use patterns change consumers invest more in household appliances to 
improve their levels of comfort and entertainment.  With mass produced televisions, 
CD and DVD players and radios from countries such as China and India, the prices of 
these devices have declined over time and this has led their penetration into the rural 
areas of developing countries. However, in line with a responsible demand-side 
management approach, i.e. sustainability with regards to energy consumption, the 
GoK needs to ensure that the energy efficiency of such goods is closely monitored, by 
clear labelling showing the efficiency ratings of such products. 
 
(e) Increasing market ownership and performance of private suppliers 
Market ownership for grid-electricity lies with the KPLC, which controls both the 
transmission and distribution sides. This model is a one distributor approach and it 
could be modified to accommodate private sector participation and ownership. Kenya 
has a number of well established independent power producers (IPPs); however, the 
transmission and distribution is not privatized, as the KPLC is partially state owned. If 
privatization were allowed, then there would be alternative options for transmission 
and distribution.  
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On the one hand, charging full cost to customers is beneficial, but on the other, 
these charges can be too high for consumers to afford, hence creating an incentive for 
self-generation. Analyzing international private participation in power projects, an 
ESMAP paper reported that nearly 70% of private participation in developing 
countries was concerned with generation activities, whereas electricity transmission 
stood at only 3% and distribution at 14%. This would suggest potential investors 
perceive the latter two areas of operation as carrying significant market and 
commercial risks (Covindassamy et al. 2005). Nevertheless, the government has an 
important role in maintaining competition in the market for both on-and-off grid, by 
ensuring that rates are competitive. In other words, their role is to ensure that 
electricity prices are on a level playing field.  
 
One suggestion emerging from this study is that there is a need for an 
alternative model for addressing the REP objectives, by offering both grid-and off-
grid options and not simply concentrating on the former. We propose that part of 
Kenya’s REP strategy could take the form of the setting up of a rural energy service 
company (RESCO) to provide electricity for households, as well as the community.  
Households would then contract a RESCO for either grid or off-grid electricity 
services and for maintenance and repair of equipment owned by the company. 
Alternatively, the equipment could become the property of the household after a 
specified payment period.  A good example of this system can be found in India, 
where local electricity retailers, like the independent rural power producers (IRPP), 
own small businesses or cooperatives and they secure credit financing to establish an 
off-grid system or mini-grid. The latter is achieved by either creating a new 
distribution system or leasing a sub-station already in existence (ESMAP 2000b). 
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Another effective approach has been one in Sri Lanka, where the World Bank/GEF 
Energy Services and the national utilities established “non-negotiable” power-
purchase tariffs and contracts (PPAs) with third-party mini-hydro developers (Miller 
and Martinot 2001). The introduction of these IPPs and PPAs, along with 
concessions, has accelerated the privatization of the markets. In Kenya, various PPAs 
have been established with the IPPs, but what appears to have played an important 
role in securing these deals is the involvement of multilateral organizations, that bring 
credibility to the projects (Eberhard and Gratwick 2005).  
 
The Kenyan market for PV systems is completely privately owned and the suppliers 
are actively engaged in connecting and distributing solar PV services, on a cash basis. 
According to GTZ Eastern Africa Resource Base (2006), it was estimated that the PV 
module sales figure was around 25,000 to 30,000 annually and approximately 200,000 
rural households owned solar systems. Conversely, the average annual connection of 
new REP users was 100,000 and the total numbers of rural electrified households was 
180,000 at this time (KPLC 2005/6). What we suggest in this study is that there is a 
need to step up to a fee-for-service model, like that of Zambia, where energy service 
companies (ESCOs) provide households with PV services on a fee basis. Adopting a 
fee-for-service plan allows for a monthly fee to be charged and in return off-grid 
services are provided. With an ESCO there is a ‘market-oriented approach’ to 
marketing a PV system as a ‘service package’, rather than one of ‘functional 
hardware’ (Gustavsson and Ellegard 2004). Van der Vleuten et al. (2007) have put 
forward two institutional models for PV markets.  One is the involvement of an ESCO 
or third party dealer in receiving concessions through a government agency to finance 
the PV systems to users, whereas the other, after Nieuwenhout et al. (2000),  is fee-
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for-service through a third energy party (or ESCO). 5 The latter model i.e. the fee-for-
service, is recommended by us because as Varho (2002) pointed out, such ESCO 
rental systems involve close collaboration with communities and consequently it is 
easier to reduce payment default levels.  Moreover, over time the ESCO provider of 
PV systems can transfer the ownership of the system after all payments have been 
completed by the households. In addition, the ESCO’s ownership and maintenance of 
the solar systems can ensure that they continue to function, so long as households pay 
the usage fee (Kaufman et al. 2000). The disadvantage of this method is that it 
requires business management and technical know-how to operate and hence be 
viable in the long run, a feature which tends to be lacking in rural areas (Cabraal et al. 
1996).  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The benefits of electricity services cover both indirect and direct gains.  The data 
presented in this study has shown that these quantifiable benefits, obtained from WTP 
estimations, weighed against the subsidies received by users and the costs incurred in 
electricity generation and distribution by suppliers, can allow for the calculation of the 
welfare benefits of electrification (Table 8). Moreover, electricity benefits are not only 
experienced by current users, but also potential users. Hence, policies should be in 
place, not only to improve existing electricity services, but also to connect those who 
are non-electrified. The paper has discussed the constraints on extending electricity in 
this way and has made some proposals for overcoming these. 
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The roles of the different service providers, namely the: public, private and 
community-based agencies that are needed for electrifying households should 
function in a complementary way and this would create healthy competition among 
all the protagonists (Barnes and Floor 1996). Moreover, the Kenyan policy makers as 
well as the producers and distributors should take the opportunity to learn from other 
developing or emerging markets’ REP models, to guide them in revamping their 
current programme. The government position, in providing long-term subsidies for 
operating and maintenance costs to entities, should be diverted to focusing on 
providing; one-off subsidies to private investors and equity financing or long-term 
loans to intermediaries, in order to help in the financing of rural electrification. At the 
consumption level, it is recommended is that the subsidies are re-directed to benefit 
the poor by helping them to get electricity and by lowering the lifeline tariff 
consumption unit for poor households to 25 kWh or less.  As explained above, this 
group consumes such small amounts of electricity and as a result they would be the 
main benefactors of such a change. Two options that are available to allow for the 
fulfilment of this recommendation are: firstly, charging the lifeline tariff to only those 
who consume less than 25 kWh and secondly, charging the lifeline tariff to everybody 
for the first 25 kWh consumed and thereafter charging a higher price. The former is 
the fairer option, however, it is politically difficult and discourages consumption for 
poor households who would like to consume above 25 kWh. That is, under these 
circumstances there can be a social trap where some poor households are subsidized at 
a lower rate than others, but are deterred from increasing their energy consumption. 
We suggest there should be a better integrated assessment of electricity subsidies in 
Kenya, as well as in other developing countries, that can help to identify the winners 
and losers in the different social groups in relation to energy subsidy reforms.  
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 The case studies presented in this study have been aimed at highlighting some of 
the best practices and principles that could be adopted to meet the challenges of the 
REP in Kenya. From this best practice and the empirical analysis, we argue that there 
is a need to: identify, target and set tariffs for vulnerable groups, such as the poor and 
strategically important economic sectors, especially agriculture.  
 
In general, we urge that the perspectives of present electricity users or prospective 
electricity users, as described in their willingness to pay for different electricity 
services, should be the driving force behind the shaping of the REP in developing 
countries, such as Kenya. In other words, the REP should involve a bottom-up 
approach, where users’ needs and preferences determine the electricity policies 
adopted. In return, policy makers need to formulate regulations that incorporate 
consumer preferences and to develop, either grid-electricity or decentralized 
electricity systems, to meet the consumers’ needs at affordable prices with plausible 
payment periods and reasonable interest rates. In conclusion, the government as a 
facilitator of the REP needs to be more transparent and accountable in its actions, so 
as to increase the efficacy of the electricity services, to both current users and 
potential consumers. 
6. NOTES 
1 In July 2008 new tariff rates were approved, whereby consumer categories were revised to: domestic, 
small commercial, commercial/industrial, interruptible and street lighting. 
2 All costs include fixed and consumption charges for each category. 
3 1 US$ = Ksh. 67 (30 July 2008); source: Central Bank of Kenya, found at 
http://www.centralbank.go.ke [accessed on 10 September 2008] 
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4Acker and Kammen (1996) reported that for every kilometre of electrification grid extension costs for 
the KPLC were Ksh 500,000 (US$8,200). Aligula et al. (2006) cited that the MoE estimates in 2003 
showed that about Ksh. 1.3 million was used to construct one kilometre of an 11 KV or 33 KV line in 
rural areas. 
5 The difference between these two models is that the former has more conditions prescribed by 
donor/institutional provider in: terms of coverage, number of users and time period to disseminate the 
systems.  
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